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Abstract 
 
This paper examines labour transnationalism within four multinational automakers.  In 
our sample, we find different forms of labour transnationalism, including transnational 
collective bargaining, mobilisation, information exchange and social codes of conduct.  
We explain these differences through the interaction between management and labour in 
the context of the company structure; of particular importance are transnational coercive 
comparisons by management and the orientations of worker representatives as political 
entrepreneurs or co-managers.  We conclude that, although intensified worker-side cross-
border cooperation were not preventing wage-based competition in general (due to the 
lack of between-firm coordination), they have reshaped employment relations within 
these MNCs.   
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Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Hans Böckler Foundation, ILR’s International Programs, 
Cornell’s Institute for European Studies, Cornell’s Einaudi Center for International Studies and the German 
Academic Exchange Service. 
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Labour transnationalism is by now a well researched subject, especially in multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in Europe.  Much literature has analyzed the emergence of labour 
transnationalism and its structural forms (Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie and 
Winchester 2006; Müller, Platzer and Rüb 2004), its embeddedness in national and local 
industrial relations arrangements (Hancké 2000; Lillie and Martínez Lucio 2004), and the 
role of the sector and European integration (Marginson 2000), but it remains unclear how 
it becomes strategic for worker representatives facing threats of disinvestment.  Do trade 
unionists view it as a tool for in-plant, national, or transnational action?  Could it limit the 
intense competition behind concession bargaining? 
 We examine labour transnationalism at the automotive firms DaimlerChrysler, 
General Motors (GM), Ford/Visteon and Volkswagen (VW).  Common to these four 
firms is strong collective labour representation, as indicated by high union density and 
broad, overlapping representation bodies such as labour unions, works councils, 
supervisory boards, European Works Councils (EWCs) and, in two firms, World Works 
Councils (WWCs).  These companies all began a restructuring process in the 1990s, 
including the building of new production capacity, the closure and downsizing of older 
plants, the outsourcing and spinning off parts production, and the purchase or 
construction of new plants.  During this period, managers set up transnational in-firm 
competition in various ways, from blatant whipsawing – in which management plays 
plants off against each other in order to extract concessions from labour – to more subtle 
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comparisons and benchmarking, and union-side international cooperation intensified in 
response.   
Labour transnationalism, however, plays out differently at each firm.  At 
DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen, we see global-level information sharing, and, to some 
extent, global standard setting over labour rights.  Here, labour transnationalism is a 
matter of providing a minimal level of information and collective rights for foreign 
colleagues.  These works councils, however, have done little to prevent competition 
between locations.  At two other firms, Ford and GM, we see European-level 
coordination and bargaining.  While unionists at GM and Ford have used worked to 
influence restructuring at a in Europe, their colleagues at VW and DaimlerChrysler have 
extended transnationalism beyond Europe.  At GM, European worker representatives 
have organised transnational mobilisations to resist plant closures and dismissals. 
 We base these case studies on 197 semi-structured interviews between 2003 and 
2007,1 as well as archival sources and press reports.  Although most transnational activity 
is confined to Europe, we examine its global extension, where applicable.  Our narratives 
begin in the 1990s with labour-side responses to international competition. 
 Examining labour transnationalism in MNCs is becoming important as they 
expand.  The ratio of outward Foreign Direct Investments from MNCs to total global 
Gross Domestic Product more than doubled between 1996 and 2004, from 11% to 24% 
(UNCTAD 2005).  If trade unionism extended itself to the national level in the late 19th 
                                                 
1
 We conducted these interviews in Germany, the US, Spain, and the UK.  In each country we spoke to 
national-level and in-plant trade unionists responsible for each firm (including, where possible, different 
caucuses and unions).  In Germany, Spain and the US, we also spoke to managers, workers, regional trade 
union officials and academics. In Germany and Spain we talked as well to employer association 
representatives. 
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 to mid 20th century, as nation-wide firms, states and markets became more important, it 
is worth asking whether an analogous process is underway in the 21st century.  We define 
labour transnationalism as the spatial extension of trade unionism through the 
intensification of cooperation between trade unionists across countries using transnational 
tools and structures. 
This paper begins with a review of the literature on labour transnationalism, 
followed by a preview of our evidence. Then we offer an explanation for the different 
patterns of labour transnationalism, emphasising the interaction between management 
and labour in the context of the company structure.  Of particular importance are 
management’s ability and willingness to whipsaw and the orientations of worker 
representatives.  The latter, we suggest, can be classified as political entrepreneurship and 
co-management.  The following empirical section consists of four case studies on labour 
transnationalism in multinational automotive companies.  Finally, we provide a 
comparative assessment of the case studies and conclude that, although competition and 
concessions and within-plant job retention remain important, international trade union 
cooperation has reshaped employment relations within these MNCs. 
 
 
Labour transnationalism and the internationalisation of firms 
 
The internationalisation of markets and firms has transformed labour relations.  In 
manufacturing, unions grew up in order to prevent ‘ruinous competition’, as local and 
regional product and labour markets were supplanted by national ones (Commons 1909).  
In the first half of the 20th century they began to consolidate themselves by accepting the 
rules of national industrial relations systems.  By the late 20th century, as imports began 
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to penetrate these national markets, as corporations established production locations 
around the world, and as collective bargaining began to lose its ability to provide both 
competitiveness and worker well-being, unions in the Global North had increasing 
difficulty sustaining their members’ wage levels.   
The notion that workers would coordinate across national boundaries in response 
to globalisation has not been self-evident to industrial relations theorists.  To the contrary, 
some writers have suggested that, in the face of international markets, unions could take 
advantage of the decentralisation of business activity, either at the regional level (Piore 
and Sabel 1984) or at the in-plant level (Katz 1993).  Others have argued that national 
institutions would continue to protect workers, because of the interests of employers in 
stability (Thelen 2001) or comparative institutional advantages (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 In the mid-1990s, Turner (1996) argued that the structural preconditions for 
labour transnationalism existed, at least in Europe, but had not yet been filled out by 
action.  Since then, a literature has grown up on this process, addressing the globalisation 
of industries (Anner et al 2006) and corporate structures (Müller, Platzer and Rüb 2004); 
the Europeanisation of social policymaking (Keller and Platzer 2003); and even – in the 
case of seafarers – negotiated global wage minima (Lillie 2006).  This literature 
emphasises the opportunities for labour transnationalism and sees EWCs as ‘vehicles for 
labour-oriented networking’ (Martínez Lucio and Weston 2004: 41) and the globalisation 
of firms as a potential stimulus for ‘organisational learning’ by unions (Kädtler and 
Sperling, 2002).    
Other writers identify constraints.  For example, Wolfgang Streeck (1998) argued 
that EWCs were not transnational, but rather extensions of national industrial relations 
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systems that articulated national or local interests.  Hancké (2000) argued that, in the 
European automotive industry, EWCs tended to facilitate, rather than impede, 
management-led restructuring, by giving worker representatives information to use in 
local productivity coalitions.  Beyond the auto industry, observers found that the 
Europeanisation of in-firm industrial relations was not connected to an extension of 
collective bargaining (Lecher, Nagel and Platzer 1999), that managers were using EWCs 
to generate consent for downsizing (Tuckman and Whitall 2002), and that the actions of 
trade unionists remained shaped by national identities (Timming 2006).  Moreover, as 
Dølvik (1997) showed, national unions have preferred to serve their members at home 
and resisted a transfer of power to the European Trade Union Confederation. 
BMW’s sale of Rover in 2000 seemed to confirm this scepticism.  Having bought 
British automaker Rover in 1994 in hopes of entering a mass-production market, BMW 
managers had, five years on, failed to increase Rover’s market share.  As it became clear 
that management wanted to break up Rover, international relations between worker 
representatives became tense.  The works council knew management’s intentions because 
of German co-determination rules and in-firm co-management practices; British worker 
representatives, by contrast, were kept in the dark.  BMW sold one plant to Ford, retained 
two plants, and handed the largest plant – which was eventually closed – to a consortium 
of investors (Armour and Deakin 2000; Tuckman and Whittall 2006; Villiers, 2001).  
British worker representatives at Rover arguably lacked the information they were 
entitled to under national law, never mind the additional leverage supposedly provided by 
the EWC.  Although a transnational structure existed, it did not alleviate the conflicts of 
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interest between national unionists or compensate for the varying degrees of privilege in 
their access to management.     
Since then, however, several events have raised doubts about the arguments of the 
sceptics.  First, the EWC at GM has organised days of action, including work stoppages 
by as many as 40,000 workers, to pull management into European-level bargaining 
(Costa and Rehfeldt 2007).  This suggests that EWC are not always useful to 
management, and that there is not always a trade-off between local interests and 
international solidarity.  Second, the EWC at GM and at Visteon have negotiated 
collective agreements at the European level, in order to ‘share the pain’ of restructuring 
and limit competition in bidding processes introduced by management; at VW and 
DaimlerChrysler the union camp has agreed to reject the work of other plants in the event 
of a strike.  Thus, worker representatives are coordinating in ways that do not seem 
particularistic, and bargaining has not been simply decentralised.  Third, two EWCs at 
DaimlerChrysler and VW, established even broader forums of worker representation, 
World Works Councils, which negotiate international framework agreements regulating 
labour standards at the companies and their suppliers. 
 
Explaining labour transnationalism 
We argue that the forms of labour transnationalism depend on the interaction between 
management and labour strategies in the context of the company structure; of particular 
importance are management’s whipsawing practices and labour’s orientations as co-
managers or political entrepreneurs.  This argument is actor-centred and emphasises the 
strategies of management and labour but also recognises that actors have built structures 
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with implications for future action.  Once established, European and World Works 
Councils, production networks (platforms), and the proximity of worker representatives 
to corporate headquarters all affect the labour-management interaction.   
 
(Table one about here) 
 
1. Labour orientations: Political entrepreneurship and co-management 
Trade unionists pursue several goals when they do international work, including securing 
labour rights and standards, constraining whipsawing and competition within the firm, 
avoiding dismissals and plant closures, and securing a fair distribution of production 
across plants.  We see two different political orientations of individuals and collective 
labour organisations that lead to different sets of labour strategies and repertoires of 
action: co-management and political entrepreneurship.  
 Political entrepreneurship refers in this paper to the exploration of transnational 
strategies by individual unionists and their organisations.  Union leaders have to represent 
the interests of their constituency, which in turn has to confirm the course of the 
leadership in democratic elections.  Given these constraints, political entrepreneurs play 
an essential role in the development of labour transnationalism (Müller, Platzer and Rüb 
2004).  Political entrepreneurs have the vision to explore transnational strategies and the 
leadership skills to convince their constituency.  They are creative as organisers, can 
communicate with colleagues and management in English, are ready to mobilise the 
workforce and public opinion, hire dedicated staff to support their international work, and 
build networks of international relationships over many years. The overarching goal is to 
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regulate restructuring through transnational collective bargaining, and the main methods 
are transnational mobilizing and coordination.  Political entrepreneurs develop forms of 
leverage independent from their relationship with management and are not working in 
close proximity to world headquarters.  
A different orientation is co-management, which usually involves an exchange: 
management grants trade unionists a role in decision-making, and trade unionists then 
bear responsibility for the resulting decisions.  Co-managers limit their mobilisation role 
and their resort to public pronouncements but receive more information and financial 
resources from the company.  This happens more often when worker representatives 
operate in close spatial proximity to global headquarters: German trade unionists engage 
in in-depth co-management at German headquarters, and their U.S. colleagues do 
likewise at Ford and GM (Anner et al 2006).  Co-management happens in a more diluted 
form in Spain and the UK, at times with help from European Works Councillors based in 
Germany.  Co-managers rely on cooperation from management in developing their 
strategies and attempt to integrate or suppress worker representatives who oppose labour-
management cooperation. 
 
2. Management: Transnational whipsawing and platform strategies 
Two sets of international management strategies – the production strategy and labour 
relations strategy – are crucial in shaping labour transnationalism.  As lean production 
has taken hold in the industry, production has become more standardised and locations 
more comparable.  ‘Coercive comparisons’, enabled by systematic benchmarking of 
production sites, has long been central to management’s bargaining strategy (Mueller and 
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Purcell 1992).  More recently, managers have won even more flexibility to shift 
production according to fluctuations in demand by introducing a small number of 
‘platforms’ across the various brands; this has further enhanced their capacity for 
transnational whipsawing.   
Whipsawing capacity varies considerably in our sample.  The most clearly 
contrasting cases are GM and DaimlerChrysler.  GM has introduced shared platforms, 
allowing them to produce different brands (Saab, Opel, Vauxhall) with similar parts and 
standardised assembly procedures.  This has allowed management to shift production 
more easily between plants, and managers have aggressively used this ability to threaten 
worker representatives with disinvestment and win concessions.  At DaimlerChrysler, by 
contrast, plants are specialised, overcapacity is less of a problem, and management’s 
ability to shift production internationally is relatively limited.  VW and Ford occupy 
intermediate positions.  Compared to DaimlerChrysler, Ford and VW managers have 
more ways and pressures to shift work between plants, but compared to GM, a less 
confrontational negotiation style.  At Ford, whipsawing capacity is less than at GM and 
VW, because there are fewer assembly plants, less parallel production, and therefore 
fewer exit options.  
 
DaimlerChrysler: Global labour standards setting i 
 Baden-Württemberg-based DaimlerChrysler was the product of Daimler-Benz’s 
purchase of the U.S. automaker Chrysler in 1998.  At the time of the merger, Daimler-
Benz had more than twice as many employees than Chrysler.  Three large German sites, 
Sindelfingen, Mannheim and Untertürkheim, were built before World War II, and 
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afterwards the firm expanded into other parts of West Germany and abroad, in to Brazil, 
South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, Spain, Argentina and Indonesia.  DaimlerChrysler also 
purchased two US-based truck manufacturers (Freightliner and Detroit Diesel) and a 
stake in Mitsubishi, established the subsidiary, Smart, and established Mercedes 
production in the US.  In May 2007, Chrysler was sold to the private equity firm 
Cerberus. 
 German works councillors have taken the lead in building transnational structures 
with their pre-merger work with colleagues in the Global South and post-merger work 
with North American colleagues.  Because 95% of the firm’s European car production is 
in Germany, international coordination mainly takes place at the global, rather than 
European level.  The international work originated in the 1980s, not as a response to 
economic pressures, but at the urging of church officials, mainly in support of strikes in 
South Africa and Brazil.  Though ‘official’ works councillors and leftist dissidents in 
Germany conduct their international work separately (and former have attempted to 
marginalise the latter, through threatened expulsion from IG Metall and refusing to 
allocate works council funds to their projects), both are guided more by a political 
concern for labour rights than by fears of whipsawing. 
The merger led to a deepening of international ties due to uncertainty felt on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Although management promised a ‘merger of equals’, noticeable 
changes began to take place.  In Germany, management introduced ‘lean production’ 
techniques developed in the U.S. and Japan, and in the US, management announced a 
massive redundancy programme.  Unionists responded by holding regular international 
meetings, including UAW participation on the supervisory board, a somewhat larger 
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‘labour committee’ (including the Canadian Auto Workers) to prepare for supervisory 
board meetings, and a considerably larger International Automotive Group (including 
representatives from Spain, Brazil and South Africa).  Bringing a UAW representative to 
the supervisory board was a major innovation.  The UAW used the supervisory board for 
information, rather than as a strategic tool, reflecting its national focus on crisis 
management.  The IG Metall and UAW, in cooperation with their global umbrella 
organisation (the International Metalworkers Federation, or IMF), then negotiated with 
management to set up a world works council, known as the World Employee Council 
(WEC).  The WEC was kept much smaller than the EWC out of cost considerations, but 
had much the same purpose of information and consultation, funded by the company.  It 
has six German members, three from the US and one each from Spain, Brazil, South 
Africa and Canada, but excludes Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and Turkey.   
Parallel to the WEC meetings, worker representatives and managers negotiated 
the firm’s Principles of Social Responsibility.  This code, patterned on the UN’s Global 
Compact, protects workers against violations of core labour standards, such as child 
labour, forced labour and various kinds of discrimination, while encouraging positive 
labour-management relations and requiring neutrality in union organizing campaigns.  
The company agreed to enforce the agreement not only in-house, but also at its suppliers.  
While DaimlerChrysler does not monitor suppliers’ factories, its labour relations 
department supports trade unionists and whistleblowers when complaints arise.   
Because worker representatives and managers did not think they would find many 
violations, the agreement was uncontroversial.  They were surprised when workers in 
supplier plants began to file complaints, mainly for being fired for trade union work; in 
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the first three years, there were 15 offenders, including establishments in Turkey, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, the US and – unexpectedly – Germany.  In contrast to most firms, whose 
codes only exist on paper, DaimlerChrysler’s code requires the company to respond.  In 
most cases, workers win reinstatement, although DaimlerChrysler does not force union 
recognition (Works council and IG Metall interview 21 May 2005). 
Shows of international solidarity at DaimlerChrysler are not unheard of, but have 
only limited relevance to international competition, given the structure of production.  In 
1996, Untertürkheim’s works council turned down orders to work Saturdays, to make up 
for lost axle production from a strike in Brazil.  During a 2001 strike in South Africa, 
German works councillors similarly refused to pick up the slack, and Brazilians 
supported a 2002 warning strike in Germany with a brief walkout.  These actions are 
important for their symbolic use in specific disputes, but have not prevented concession 
bargaining (Works Council Interview 25 November 2005).   
German works councillors doubt that the company would shift work to smaller 
plants in the global south, because these seem to specialise in specific markets.  The only 
parallel production is with the C-class, produced both in Sindelfingen (in Baden-
Württemberg) and Bremen (in northern Germany); otherwise, threats are limited to future 
investment decisions or relatively small amounts of work.  While Sindelfingen and 
Bremen employ about 30,000 and 15,500 workers respectively, the South African plant 
making right-handed C-class (mainly for the British market) has fewer than 4000 
workers, and the Brazilian plant making the A-class, 1500.  Because Mercedes factories 
tend to specialise in unique products, worker representatives believe that company lacks 
the capacity to make good on major threats to shift work across borders (ibid). 
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Because the main whipsawing threats occur domestically, international solidarity 
is seen as having little relevance to the problem.  In 2004, for example, the company 
threatened to shift C-class assembly work to Bremen from Sindelfingen, threatening 6000 
jobs, if the works council did not agree to a package of concessions.  Management’s 
demands included the undercutting of a working time provision from Baden-
Wuerttemberg’s sectoral agreement dating back to the 1970s, which sparked an 
impressive mobilisation domestically.  International support came from South Africa and 
Brazil in the form of solidarity letters and – at least in Brazil – demonstrations.  In the 
end, the works councillors agreed to a set of concessions that kept the sectoral agreement 
intact, but saved the firm €500 million a year.  Rather than using international 
coordination, the works council spread the concessions beyond Sindelfingen to other 
German plants.  The central works council thus maintained inter-plant solidarity within 
Germany, but introduced longer work hours for workers doing indirect labour, such as 
cooking and cleaning, and lower wage tiers for new hires (Anonymous 2004).ii   
Amid widespread disappointment with Chrysler’s performance, the Daimler-
Chrysler merger came unravelled, as Chrysler was sold to a private equity firm.  Initially, 
UAW officials were opposed to the deal and worried that the new owner would ‘strip and 
flip’, rather than develop a sustainable business.  After meetings with works councillors 
and Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche, UAW leaders changed their position, despite continued 
opposition by Canadian unionists.  Convinced of the deal’s inevitability and reassured by 
provisions to fund pensions, they joined the rest of the supervisory board to vote in 
favour of the sale.  Despite worries about private equity more generally, IG Metall and 
UAW officials chose a non-confrontational approach to the Cerberus takeover.   
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Ford/Visteon: European bargaining  
Ford is a Michigan-based company with a significant presence in Europe.  The 
firm established plants in on the outskirts of Cologne (Niehl) and London (Dagenham) in 
the 1920s, and after World War Two, it extended its presence by building assembly 
plants in Valencia (Spain); Saarlouis (Germany); Genk (Belgium); and Halewood (UK).  
More recently, it has acquired new luxurybrands, including Volvo in Sweden and three 
British brands known as the Premier Automotive Group (PAG): Jaguar, Land Rover and 
Aston Martin.  It has also expanded its Ottosan van-making joint venture in Izmit 
(Turkey), and built a plant in St. Petersburg to serve the Russian market.  In the late 
1990s, it began to concentrate ‘blue oval’ assembly work in Germany and powertrain 
work in the UK, while converting Valencia into a ‘swing plant’, capable of both kinds 
work. Compared to VW and GM, Ford built up less parallel production across Europe, 
and chose instead to downsize production in order to increase plant utilisation. 
Like at GM, Ford worker representatives have used the EWC for leverage in 
European bargaining.  Although international redundant capacities are less important and 
production more narrowly spread in Europe than at GM, management has a less 
confrontational approach than at GM.  Transnational collective bargaining has taken 
place over a large spin-off (Visteon, which took over Ford’s parts operations) and a joint 
venture (GFT, which makes transmissions), in which the EWC – with the help of the 
UAW – used transnational bargaining to influence workplace restructuring.   
Ford’s European Works Council was established under the direction of Wilfried 
Kuckelkorn.  Kuckelkorn was head of the central works council from 1984 to 2001 and, 
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between 1994 and 2004, a Member of the European Parliament.  As chair of the EWC 
from 1996 to 2001, he orchestrated the Visteon spinoff agreement, Kuckelkorn played a 
central role in winning the support of the UAW.  After the fatal 1999 explosion at the 
River Rouge plant, Kuckelkorn organised a collection from German workers for the 
families of the victims, which he personally presented to the UAW.  Later, when he 
requested support in the Visteon negotiation, the UAW Vice President for Ford flew to 
Cologne to support Kuckelkorn’s demand (works council interview 02 April 2004).  
This spinoff affected nearly 20,000 workers in Europe and led to the first 
transnational collective agreement.  It included the eight main Visteon plants in Europe, 
including four in the UK, three in Germany and one in France.  While there is some 
uncertainty as to whether Visteon management wanted this agreement to be Europe-wide, 
it did allow them to win something that they were denied in the US: Visteon workers 
were transferred into the new company, rather than remaining Ford workers.  Ford agreed 
to a parts catalogue that would give Visteon until 2007 to find new customers, and 
Visteon’s incumbent workers were guaranteed wages and working conditions that 
mirrored those at Ford.  The second transnational agreement, with similar provisions, 
involved the spin-off of transmission production into a joint venture with a smaller firm, 
GFT, with 3900 employees in Halewood (UK), Bordeaux (France) and Cologne 
(Germany).  This business thrived, and bargaining proved to be less difficult than at 
Visteon.   
A third transnational agreement came in 2003.  With end of the sourcing 
agreement with Ford in sight, Visteon deepened its concessions, once again with the 
involvement of the Ford EWC.  The company continued to lose money, and the EWC 
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negotiated a set of plant-by-plant cost savings targets.  The agreement, called Plan for 
Growth, contained a list of products in various plants, either to be expanded or 
eliminated, depending on the assessments of Ford and Visteon managers for future 
market share.  In Germany, the agreements included redundancies, the elimination of 
over-tariff payments for any future workers, a wide range of outsourcing measures to 
bring workers into plants under cheaper collective agreements, and the creation of a 
‘transfer corporation’ to help redundant workers find new jobs (works council and 
management interviews 26 August 2004).   
Compared to Visteon and GFT, Ford labour and management used transnational 
strategies much less for the restructuring of assembly work, beginning in the late 1990s.  
Management’s strategy was to reduce overcapacities: in 1999, Ford had the capacity in 
Europe to produce 2.2 million cars, but only sold 1.65 million cars.  Ford discontinued 
assembly at its Dagenham plant, converted its Halewood plant to Jaguar production, sold 
its plants in Portugal, closed plants in Belarus and Poland, and dismissed 3000 workers in 
Genk (Automotive Intelligence News 16 May 2000).  Although management informed 
and consulted labour in the EWC according to the directive, negotiations over the 
restructuring took place at the local level, mostly in a non-confrontational manner.  
Although Ford had historically used international whipsawing to extract 
concessions in plant-level bargaining (Mueller and Purcell 1992), restructuring since the 
late 1990s limited whipsawing by concentrating production in fewer locations.  In 
Dagenham, for example, the company offset 1900 job losses from closing the assembly 
plant with 500 new jobs in a global centre for diesel engine technology.   
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Although Ford had less capacity for coercive comparisons than GM, whipsawing 
has not completely disappeared.  In 2005, European management discussed the 
production of the new Fiesta with worker representatives at the Cologne and Valencia 
plants. The Spanish UGT (Union General de Trabajadores) and the German works 
council negotiated separate local agreements over the terms of securing Fiesta 
production, and the EWC did not interfere. The agreement in Cologne introduced lower 
tier wages for newly employed workers in exchange for a moratorium on employment 
security until 2011.     
At Visteon, too, management has shifted bargaining to the local and national 
levels, with little resistance from worker representatives.  In 2005, Visteon was 
threatened by bankruptcy.  Although the 2003 agreement had secured investment in each 
plant, global management was redefining its core business in ways that did not 
correspond to these plans.  In Germany, the new agreement marked a departure from the 
first Visteon agreement by reducing the pay of core workers.  In the UK, labour and 
management have agreed to introduce additional personnel cuts and outsourcing (union 
interviews 17 March 2006).  
 
 
General Motors: European mobilisation and bargaining   
GM is a Detroit-based firm with a semi-autonomous subsidiary, GM Europe.  Its 
oldest plants were established in Antwerp and Rüsselsheim during the 1920s; others were 
established after World War II in Azambuja (Portugal), Bochum (West Germany), 
Ellesmere Port (UK) and Zaragossa (Spain).  After the fall of communism, GM built 
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further assembly plants in Eisenach (East Germany) and Gliwice (Poland), in hopes of 
capturing consumer markets to the east, and purchased Saab, with production in 
Trollhätten (Sweden).  
Labour transnationalism at GM is a response to transnational whipsawing by 
management.  During two periods, 1993/4 and 1997/8, management used concessions in 
one country to extract them in another (Eller-Bratz and Klebe 1998). National labour 
strategies were exhausted, and none of the plants had privileged access to the European 
headquarters in Zürich. In this context, worker representatives began to explore 
transnational strategies. The EWC was founded in 1996 and, compared to Ford, had a 
stable composition, gave representatives time to get to know and trust each other. In 
addition, a German works councillor, Klaus Franz, envisioned labour transnationalism as 
a central resource to counter cross-border whipsawing, pushed for a more extensive 
coordination in the EWC, and began to develop transnational instruments.  He later 
became head of the European and German works council and played a central role in the 
transnational negotiations and mobilisations that followed.  
The EWC sought to limit the transnational whipsawing and competition by 
negotiating collective agreements with GM’s European management.  The EWC’s first 
negotiations took place over the joint venture with FIAT.  In March 2000, GM managers 
announced a powertrain joint venture with FIAT without consulting the EWC.  Worker 
representatives viewed this as a breach of the original EWC agreement, which required 
consultation with the EWC over major restructuring; in Bochum, trade unionists 
responded with a wildcat strike.  At the same time, the EWC leadership began talks with 
management and insisted on a transnational framework agreement.  Management agreed 
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to European-level negotiations in order to salvage the deal with FIAT.  Like at Visteon, 
all GM workers transferred to the new firm had the same terms and conditions as the core 
workforce (works council interview 18 April 2005).  
In December 2000, a second conflict, over the closure of the Luton plant, led to a 
Europe-wide action-day and consolidated the EWC’s role as a negotiation body (Herber 
and Schäfer-Klug 2001).  Although management informed the EWC, the announcement 
sparked immediate and fierce local labour protest at the Luton plant and EU-wide 
mobilisation in response.  On 25 January 2001, 40,000 GM workers participated in a 
European Action Day against the plant closure.  Parallel to the protest, negotiations 
between management and EWC reached a breakthrough.  The EWC’s chairman, Franz, 
announced the resolution via a conference phone to protesting workers in Germany.  
Although the plant was not saved, management agreed to avoid mandatory redundancies 
through the transfer of workers into a nearby van plant.  From management’s point of 
view, including European-level labour representatives brought in more cooperative 
negotiation partners, i.e. individuals who were not directly involved in the heated local 
conflict (management interview 22 March 2004).    
Despite restructuring efforts in previous years, the situation of GM Europe had 
barely improved, and in 2001, management announced a new plan called ‘Olympia’.  
This time, both sides agreed to European-level negotiations without a confrontation.  
Worker representatives did not doubt the need for restructuring, and, like at Visteon, 
there was a solidaristic solution that involved ‘sharing the pain’ across plants.  The 
resulting European-level agreement stipulated cost reductions for each plant but ruled out 
plants closures and forced redundancies.  
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In 2004, GM was still losing money in Europe; ‘Olympia’ had been insufficient.  
Instead of implementing a Europe-wide restructuring program, management focused on 
Germany and in October announced personnel reductions of 10,000, or every third 
German employee.  Immediately after the announcement, a wildcat strike broke loose in 
Bochum, where a plant closure was widely feared.  The EWC organised a second 
European Action Day, including more than 40,000 workers stopping work at GM’s 
European plants for at least one hour.  As the strike in Bochum became a plant 
occupation and entered its sixth day, other factories depending on it for axles had to stop 
production.  Although a Europe-wide framework agreement helped to resolve the 
conflict, the agreement could not prevent further concessions and job losses in Germany 
(EMF 2005).    
Meanwhile, management refined its whipsawing practices by building up parallel 
production and developing ‘production platforms’ of standardised products and plants 
(Pulignano 2006).  In 2003, European-level managers introduced a formal bidding 
process, in which they would offer new car production to plants of the same production 
platform (Alpha, Delta or Gamma).  Plant managers submit bids, and the plant with the 
best cost structure supposedly wins the tender, in effect, creating a within-firm market for 
new production.  Since the creation of these platforms, bidding processes have taken 
place between Rüsselsheim and Gliwice for new Zafira production, between Rüsselsheim 
and Trolhättan for the Vectra and between Gliwice and Zaragossa for the Meriva.  The 
EWC has responded by organizing a transnational information exchange in order to 
prevent plants from undercutting each other in bargaining (works council interview 5 
March 2005).    
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More recently, the EWC has moved to pre-empt whipsawing by coordinating 
across comparable sites of production.  In anticipation of the bidding process along GM’s 
largest platform (Gliwice, Ellesmere Port, Antwerp and Bochum) for the new Astra 
production, the EWC has created a Delta Platform Group, in cooperation with the 
European Metalworkers Federation.  The group consists of two labour representatives 
from each country, including a representative of the local plant and one the respective 
national union.  The group has demanded Europe-wide negotiations over the distribution 
of production, in order to secure a fair distribution of production and the survival of all 
plants (GM EWC 2006).  Worker representatives from the various Delta plants attempted 
to overcome management’s whipsawing practices by signing a Solidarity Pledge 
promising each other not to engage in individual negotiations with the European 
management.  
In 2006, management announced the closure of the plant in Azambuja (Portugal) 
and the transfer of production to the Saragossa plant in Spain. The EWC organised a third 
European Action Day in June 2006 with work stoppages at most of GM’s European 
plants. Even though the Saragossa plant was the direct beneficiary of the transfer of 
production, the local unions did not hesitate to organise a strike in solidarity with their 
Portuguese colleagues. This act of solidarity, which went against the economic self 
interest of the Spanish unions, showed to what extent worker representatives had 
developed and internalised the common norms to resist plant closures and dismissals in 
Europe. After cooperating for more than 10 years, the Spanish unions believed that they 
could count on their European colleagues in a similar crisis. The plant closure in 
Azambuja was not prevented, but the EWC helped to negotiate a redundancy agreement. 
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Volkswagen: International information sharing and paternalistic solidarity   
 
VW is a German-based firm with global headquarters and much of its production 
in Wolfsburg and Ingolstadt (Audi).  It was among the first German companies to expand 
production internationally (e.g. Brazil 1953, South Africa 1956, Mexico 1964, Belgium 
1971, Yugoslavia 1972, USA 1976, and China 1984) and employs about 340,000 
employees worldwide, about half of whom work in Germany.  Other important European 
plants are in Spain (SEAT and VW Navarra), the Czech Republic (Skoda, near Prague), 
Slovakia (Bratislava) and Great Britain (Bentley, in Crewe); outside Europe, the largest 
plants are in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and China.  Like GM, VW has been reducing the 
variety of parts and manufacturing techniques by introducing four production platforms 
across these locations (Jürgens 1998).  
Although VW works councillors had long been involved in development aid 
projects and information exchange via the IMF, their approach within Europe became 
much more institutionalised in the late 1980s.   With the acquisition of Seat in 1986 and 
Skoda in 1991 and new plant construction in Slovakia and East Germany, both in 1991, 
the works council feared intensified competition within Europe.  German works 
councillors responded by meeting with unionists from other European VW sites and by 
founding the EWC in 1990.  It was one of the first EWCs ever established and the first in 
the auto industry (Schulten 1992). Management officially recognised the European body 
in 1992, two years before the European Parliament passed the EWC directive.  
Management accepted the EWC quickly as a tool to transfer cooperative labour 
relations practices from Germany to elsewhere in Europe.  In hopes of winning worker 
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support for restructuring, management provided EWC members with much of the same 
data they provide the German works council.  Non-German representatives thus no longer 
depended on local management for their information, and were sometimes informed more 
quickly than local managers (UK union interview 23 May 2006).  
During the company’s 1993-1994 crisis, the EWC played a role in finding a 
negotiated solution without seeking a transnational collective agreement.  Management 
provided information about the financial crisis of the company in the EWC meetings, in 
order to convince labour for the need to restructure the company.  At the same time, 
collective negotiations and threats took place at the local level.  In Spanish negotiations, 
for example, when local management stated its intention to close a plant, Germany-based 
EWC members revealed to their Spanish colleagues that global management had no such 
intentions.  At SEAT, more than 4000 people were offered early retirement and 
temporary unemployment, while in Germany working time and pay were reduced.   
At the centre of labour transnationalism is the central works council, based at 
VW’s headquarters in Wolfsburg.  Its channels of influence extend beyond normal 
German industrial relations: the state of Lower Saxony’s ownership stake and the 
tradition of having an IG Metall member as Director of Labour Relations give them 
further influence.  As a result, German works councillors have developed a paternalistic 
relationship with other EWC members.  For non-German trade unionists, works 
councillors provide advice and influence, which can help in solving local problems.  
These low-profile interventions by the German works council, however, work in multiple 
ways: when managers disagree with unionists at a local foreign plant, they can ask 
German works councillors to intervene.  In 2002 bargaining over Saturday shifts at 
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SEAT, for example, German works councillors took the side of management and publicly 
criticised Spanish trade unionists for being inflexible (Tobarra 2002).   
In 1999, management recognised a World Works Council (WWC).  The WWC 
functions much like the EWC and involves an annual information exchange and 
management-labour consultation meeting.  WWC and management representatives have 
signed a social code of conduct at VW (‘Declaration on social rights and industrial 
relations at Volkswagen’).  Like at DaimlerChrysler, it is modelled on the UN’s Global 
Compact and applies to suppliers; enforcement action has taken place at VW’s Mexican 
subsidiary and at German suppliers (IMF 2006). However, reports of union-busting at in-
plant contractors suggest that enforcement is less systematic than at DaimlerChrysler. 
Until the late 1990s, VW’s labour transnationalism has enjoyed legitimacy.  
Representatives from outside Germany have regarded the access to company information 
via the EWC and WWC and to the headquarters via the German works council as an 
extension of their nationally defined resources.  Although the German works council has 
handled transnational work in a paternalistic fashion, Spanish and British trade unionists 
have in interviews depicted the German works council as a fair broker of their interests 
(UK union interview 23 May 2006).  
More recently, however, management has undermined this approach through 
intensified transnational whipsawing.  German labour representatives became aware of 
their own vulnerability in 1999, when management whipsawed the Hannover plant with 
the Bratislava plant.  German unionists were taken by surprise as management sourced 
high-quality production (the Touareg) to a low wage site.  Spanish unionists at SEAT 
faced a similar situation in 2002, when management made good on a threat to transfer 
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Ibiza production to Bratislava.  In 2005, the new manager of VW brands, Wolfgang 
Bernhard, ratcheted competition further by declaring that he would carry out US-style 
restructuring in Germany based on his experience at Chrysler and introduced GM-style 
bidding processes for new products. This came at a time when the German works council 
fell into disarray because of a bribery scandal.  In 2005, it was revealed that the head of 
the VW’s Labour Department had been illegally paying a long-time chair of the central 
works council large sums of money, and this was intended to win his support for 
restructuring and acceptance for concession bargaining (Oezgenc 2006).   
The central works council’s new leadership was confronted with further demands 
by management in 2006, such as its announcement to reduce the workforce in Brazil by 
5,000 and in Germany by 20,000, and to downsize production in Pamplona.  During this 
turbulent period, the WWC has met, but failed to resolve the conflict.  One outcome of 
the meeting was a declaration of the WWC, written with more participation from non-
German trade unionists (UK union interview 23 May 2006) and in a tone more critical of 
corporate strategy than in the past, including a resolution to resist inter-plant competition 
and the ‘resulting downward spiral of social standards’ (VW WWC 2006).  So far, 
however, this has not led to transnational mobilisation or bargaining.  
  
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Comparative Assessment  
Similarities across our cases have to do with the characteristics of the auto 
industry, which is dominated by a few, powerful multi-national companies competing 
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against each other in price- and quality-competitive markets.  In order to keep up with 
projected consumer demand, firms tend to over-invest in production capacity, which 
increases costs and reduces profits.  In order to continue making profits, they reduce 
personnel costs through layoffs, concessions, and plant closures.  Most managers and 
trade unionists – whether co-managers or political entrepreneurs – we interviewed 
understood these pressures as the facts of the situation, objective constraints with 
implications for action.    
Nevertheless, the shape of labour transnationalism differs from firm to firm, 
depending on the interaction of management and labour strategies in the context of the 
company structure.  At VW and DaimlerChrysler, global structures with limited action 
have evolved, including information and consultation bodies at the European and World 
levels and social codes of conduct covering the global supply chain.  At DaimlerChrysler, 
this exchange is of limited relevance to international competition (and hence, collective 
bargaining), compared to VW, where extensive transnational information sharing and 
consultation take place.  At both companies, labour and management have endorsed a 
social code of conduct that is enforced at suppliers, although at Daimler, enforcement 
seems more systematic.  At Ford and GM, narrower regional (European) structures have 
emerged with more substantial action, – including Europe-wide collective agreements 
over restructuring, – have emerged.  At GM, trade unionists have accomplished this 
through transnational collective action involving more than 40,000 workers.  
In these cases, labour’s orientations as political entrepreneurs and co-managers 
led to different choices over which tools or repertoires of trade unionism to use.  These 
strategies involved different principles for the distribution and negotiation of 
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restructuring.  Political entrepreneurs such as GM’s Klaus Franz and Ford’s Wilfried 
Kuckelkorn explored and pushed for new transnational strategies independent of 
management.  Because bargaining and mobilisation at an international scale were new, 
they required creativity and therefore deviated from much of what the past literature 
predicted.  Co-management, by contrast, at VW and Daimler, involved reliance on 
cooperative relations with management.  In this exchange, labour won a greater say in the 
decision making process, but, in turn, was responsible for the often painful outcomes of 
restructuring.  In our sample, this exchange correlates with close proximity of labour to 
world headquarters.  Without insider access (e.g. GM Europe), it was difficult to address 
the corporate politics of restructuring at a national level, and with insider access, worker 
representatives can be highly influential, even in difficult times.  Insider access has had a 
similar effect on the UAW at the Big Three.  
At VW and Daimler, management nurtured co-management by offering worker 
representatives considerably more access to the decision making process and more 
resources (information, offices, staff, etc.) than required by law.  In contrast, GM’s 
European management used transnational whipsawing to divide workers by location and 
extract concessions, hereby triggering cross-border labour-side coordination. 
Management’s ability to whipsaw depended on the extent to which redundant, 
comparable capacities existed along production platforms; these were greater at GM and 
VW than at Ford or DaimlerChrysler. 
 
Conclusion 
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Some of the literature on EWCs has stressed their instrumental character for management 
and union-side co-managers seeking improved competitiveness (Hancke 2000).  Others 
see in labour transnationalism a potential site of organizing with some degree of 
independence, a rebuilding of union roles and an expansion of labour-side networking at 
an international scale (Anner et al 2005).  We see truth in both of these perspectives.  
Even at contentious moments, labour transnationalism in the automotive industry is 
carried out with an eye to local job retention and competitiveness.  Threatened plant 
closures, whipsawing and concession bargaining are part of all four cases.  Nevertheless, 
labour transnationalism at multinational automakers sometimes involves genuine 
solidarity that extends across competing plants in different countries. 
 We have found several common features of in-firm labour transnationalism. As 
these firms have internationalised production, the EWC Directive on European Works 
Councils has created opportunities for in-firm labour transnationalism.  All of these 
companies experienced restructuring in the 1990s in which the location of new 
investment became more uncertain and linked to plant-level bargaining.  Worker 
representatives in different countries responded, partly by bargaining for jobs and partly 
by intensifying their contacts with one another.  International work moved beyond 
campaign-specific events or declarations; meetings of transnational bodies of trade 
unionists became regularised, along with new frameworks of rules, norms and activities 
spanning the MNC. 
It would be a mistake to treat labour transnationalism as an extension of national 
arrangements or an instrument of in-plant co-managers.  While worker representatives 
have internalised the need to be competitive, in cases of transnational bargaining or social 
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codes of conduct, worker representatives have struggled for social goods beyond national 
economic self-interest.  While managers sometimes agree to international negotiations, in 
other cases they prefer local or national agreements, and, like the current struggle over 
GM’s delta platform, EWCs have to push them into negotiations.  Lastly, while job 
retention and concession bargaining are common to all these firms, concessions can be 
solidaristic, like at GM and Visteon, where the goal was to ‘share the pain’ 
internationally.   
For commentators on EWCs in the mid-to-late 1990s, it was hardly self-evident 
that there would be European-level bargaining or mobilisation.  Indeed, institutional 
industrial relations theory is still grappling with how the agency of workers and intense, 
wage-based competition both matter.  In-firm labour transnationalism may not overcome 
competition, but it has introduced new principles of solidarity into the competitive 
environment of the international auto industry.  
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Table 1: Labour transnationalism and the interaction between management and 
labour    
 Labour 
 
Co-management 
(access to 
world headquarters) 
 
Political entrepreneurship 
(lack of access to 
world headquarters) 
M
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t 
 
Transnational whipsawing 
(standardised production 
and platform strategy) 
 
VW 
Global information sharing  
and paternalistic solidarity  
 
 
GM 
European mobilisation 
and bargaining 
 
Limited 
transnational whipsawing 
(more specialised 
production strategy) 
 
DaimlerChrysler 
Global standard setting 
 
Ford/Visteon 
European bargaining 
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Table 2.  Labour transnationalism at four MNCs 
 GM-Europe Ford/Visteon-Europe 
Daimler 
Chrysler Volkswagen GM-US Ford/Visteon-US 
Transnational 
information 
& 
consultation 
European European world/ (European)/ European/ world none none 
Non-German 
unionists on 
supervisory 
board 
n n y n n/a n/a 
Social code 
of conduct 
Europe-only, 
voluntary 
Europe-only, 
voluntary 
Global, with 
enforcement 
mechanisms, 
includes 
suppliers 
Global, with 
enforcement 
mechanisms, 
includes 
suppliers 
none none 
Transnational 
collective 
agreements 
y y n n n n 
Transnational 
coordination 
of worker 
mobilisation 
y n n n n n 
 
                                                 
i
 This section draws on case sketch drawn up by Müller, Platzer and Rüb (2004).  
ii
 Concession bargaining has also been a national matter in the US, at Chrysler, although the production network spills into Canada and Mexico.  Despite more 
economic pressures than in Germany, international cooperation is hindered by a historically bitter US-Canada rift in the union camp, a well-funded national-level 
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labour-management partnership, and no legal provisions for North American-level worker representation and lack of supranational legislation like the EWC 
directive.   
